The Quantitative Peace

We Can't Be Friends Anymore

With all of the recent bluster about North Korea, I've started thinking more about how far the NK regime can push its luck before it finally starts to become a burden to China, rather than an asset.  They seem to pop up every couple of years with some sort of wild antics, so I wonder if this time is any different?   The benefits of having NK as a sort of buffer state really seems like a relic of the Cold War.  This might have made sense on an ideological basis, as well as a security basis, at one point in time, but I have to wonder what the continued benefits are.  

More More or Less

This episode of the radio show 'More or Less', available in podcast, has a nice discussion of Arrow's impossibility theorem. It's a consistently good show for anyone interested in quantitative social science, especially how to teach it.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/podcasts/series/moreorless/

The War We Don't See

This is a topic that I'll probably expand on later, but I was just reading an article discussing the role of Hamid Karzai's brother in the present Afghan conflict.  This article gets at an issue that I've thought about before.  From the FP article cited above:

But he could not exist without the support of coalition forces. AWK has long worked closely with, and perhaps been paid by, the CIA, for whom he helps operate a paramilitary force, according to press reports.

Scribtex: online collaboration for LaTeX

Michael Flynn and I have been discussing a new project based on recent data we have discovered and our mutual academic interests.  Given that we both have become LaTeX savvy, I was hoping to find a convenient way for us to collaborate without using the archaic system of emailing each other back and forth.  My first inclination was to check Google wave as I knew it had some LaTeX written scripts for it. However, the scripts are for formulas and not complete documents.  Google Docs is another option where we write the document in LaTeX code, download the document to our computers, and then compile it separately when we need to.  This process is not overly painful and seems like it would be a next-best option to an actual LaTeX editor.  

Thankfully, after some quick Googling (I figured if I mentioned the search engine three times in one post, I would summon the great beast itself), I happened upon Scribtex.  I think this will be the solution to the problem I was hoping to overcome.  The site itself is devoted to online collaboration using LaTeX and appears to have been out for about a year now.  You can create a project and share it with multiple authors.  The free version of the site allows you to have 50mb of space and work on 3 projects (a folder containing several other files) with the account.  Higher limits require subscription to a monthly plan (between $6 and $10).  The document does syntax coloring like a normal editor as well:

I will have to play around with it a bit further to see if this ends up being exactly what I want. It currently lacks line numbers which can be pivotal in pointing to particular areas that need editing. However, the authors appear to be adding features (I believe it lacked syntax coloring a year ago) and has been seeking new feedback in the past week. Given the limitations of a free account and how much I enjoy TeXShop, I will probably use this exclusively for collaborative projects online. 

Vote For Me… I Love Oxygen, My Family, Apple Pie, And The Beatles

Do political leaders follow a set of rules when publicly listing their favourite music?

Lessons From the Past? Or Justifying an Idiosyncratic Research Agenda?

I remember reading Michael Tomz's book Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt Across Three Centuries for a seminar a couple of years ago, and someone having made a remark about how Tomz was probably just really interested in the time period or the subject matter, but had to frame the research in such a way as to justify its relevance beyond what might be the author's more narrow interests.  Since then I've had a few discussions with some of my advisers on the topic of how we frame our research--essentially how we sell a line of research as relevant to our field.  Overall though, I've found that this is a topic that seems to have stayed out of in-class discussions for the most part.

The Development of Geocentric versus Heliocentric Models of the Solar System: The Predictive versus Explanatory Powers of Models

        The predictive power of a model does not always mean that it is accurately represents the true nature of what it is trying to explain. The geocentric model of the solar system is an example of such a case. Geocentric models dominated astrology and astronomy for almost 2000 years before scientists realized that these models, despite their predictive power, did not correctly describe the nature of the stars, the planets, and their movement. And even when the proper model, the heliocentric model, was discovered, it was not fully accepted until it produced better predictions. This case calls into question whether predictive capability alone should allow a certain model to dominate the discourse of a certain research program. It also suggests that scientists in general should be more open to non-conventional models in their discipline, even if these models do not immediately provide better predictions than the conventional models.

More after the jump…

Economy of Force and Asymmetric Conflicts

Joshua Keating at Foreign Policy had a piece posted a couple of days ago that just caught my eye.  It basically talks about the current status of terrorist training camps and what the itinerary for the typical attendee entails.  It's pretty brief, but I think it covers some interesting subject matter.  And let me preface the rest of my comments by also saying that I am no expert on terrorism.  The following passage is the one that I focused on:

Typically recruits are given lessons on how to handle small arms such as AK-47s and PK machine guns as well as rocket-propelled grenades, tactics for attacking military convoys, and instructions for planting mines.  Pre-2001 al Qaeda camps also trained their recruits on sniper rifles and mortars, but this is rarer today. Students found to be quicker learners are given more specialized training in skills such as bomb-making or operational security. 

1) I think the notion that prior to 9/11 these individuals were more likely to be trained in some of these conventional forms of weaponry, like sniper rifles and mortars, is an interesting point.  Not that RPG's and assault rifles aren't conventional weaponry, but I'd guess they take considerably less training to use than is required to become a good sniper or to train a mortar team.  I've never served in the military, but it seems to me that mortars are useful primarily for taking out infantry units, or perhaps even light vehicles.  Some of my recent reading that, at least in part, covers US efforts to engage groups like al Qaeda prior to 9/11 really points to more of a covert/special forces sort of effort.  And let's not forget cruise missiles.  Given this kind of threat, it's not immediately clear to me why training your recruits in these particular weapons/tactics would be effective.  And given al Qaeda's MO it doesn't seem like either tool is really conducive to inflicting the kind of damage and fear that a bomb can.  If anything, I would imagine that these tools (sniper rifles and mortars) would be more effective after 9/11 and the invasion of Afghanistan when they are confronting military units that seem to conform to more conventional patterns of warfare.  Especially given that the terrain in Afghanistan in particular seems conducive to utilizing well-trained snipers.  And given the video footage I've seen of patrols walking along narrow mountainous paths, mortars would also appear to be effective tools. 

This may seem like minutiae when we think in terms of the US military, but I think such details are much more important when we look at much smaller outfits like al Qaeda and the Taliban, as it seems to dictate the nature of the threat military personnel face.  Furthermore, if al Qaeda's primary mission is to strike out at foreign assets and citizens then the time spent training members how to use more conventional forms of weaponry (even machine guns) would seem to be time taken away from training that is more directly useful for that primary mission.       

2)  There has been some talk in the media regarding the risk that attempts like this most recent one simply serve to clog up our intelligence and law enforcement networks, potentially allowing greater threats to slip by undetected. I would leave this to a better game theorist, but it seems like this provides a neat opportunity to model smaller group decisions on how to employ force and utilize intellectual capital(perhaps something like this exists already?).  Training a good sniper probably takes a lot of time and energy.  So not only does the group have to determine how to expend resources, or what mix of training to provide on which weapons, but it also has to decide which individuals to train more comprehensively.  Intelligent recruits are more likely to receive greater levels of training, but it also seems like they are more likely to be the ones to engage in the most dangerous missions as well.  So it seems that a group must also determine where to set the bar in terms of defining low-quality recruits and high-quality recruits.  Setting the bar higher will filter out more low-quality people, but major operations will likely take longer to plan and complete.  Setting the bar lower means that you can carry out more operations, but they're probably going to be of lower intensity and perhaps more likely to fail.  Where you set the bar also determines the mix of resources and training that you will provide.  Finally, where you set the bar might also be a function of the approaches taken by the other groups/cells that share your goals.  Even if these groups operate in relative isolation, planners can still look at the strategies employed by these other groups and choose to either emulate them, or pick a different strategy that complements the approaches taken by other groups.   

If someone is aware of something like this that already exists, I'd be interested to take a look at it.  I know papers exist that look at recruitment, as well as the variation in using violence in an indiscriminate or discriminate fashion, but I think the question here is a little different.  My understanding of terrorist cells is that they tend to operate in a relatively autonomous fashion--even if multiple groups claim the mantle of al Qaeda.  So the question here seems to be which type of cell do you want to be?  One that pops up infrequently but with potentially devastating attacks, or one that is more capable of frequently harassing the enemy but with comparatively little harm done in each individual attack?  Can you convert back and forth as needed?     

3) Lastly, I am also interested in the extent to which military forces can adjust to suit their needs.  The idea of the military and industrial worlds scratching each others' backs is not new.  And Defense Secretary Gates has made headlines recently regarding his comments on cuts to defense spending and major weapons systems.  Making such cuts is notoriously difficult.  Backers of major systems like the F-22 often point to potential adversaries down the road (like China) as a justification for maintaining such programs, even if their current utility is quite low.  Alternatively, is it possible that al Qaeda's shift away from tools like mortars and sniper rifles reflects a change of tactics in response to new circumstances?  A lack of time and resources to devote to higher standards of training?  A little of both?  Does bureaucratic self-interest really hamper the ability of large military organizations to adjust according to the needs of the current conflict?  If so, how much?  To what extent does the lack of entrenched bureaucratic interests (as far as attachments to particular modes of combat or weapons systems) aid organizations like al Qaeda in their ability to engage much larger militaries?      

Again, I realize that some of the details I've focused on are pretty fine-grained, but I think it provides a basis on which to dive into some of these broader questions.  Thoughts?

Faculty Salary, Compensation, and the Cost of Living.

Voir Dire posted a working paper yesterday that is worthy of reposting given its broad implications. The paper "University Rankings by Cost of Living Adjusted Faculty Compensation" by Terrance Jalbert, Mercedes Jalbert, and Karla Hayashi in the International Journal of Management and Marketing Research can be found at SSRN. The abstract can be viewed at either Voir Dire or SSRN, so I will save the space and not repost it here, but a bit more information can be found after the jump.  It is perhaps sufficient to say that the aggregated and averaged data can be tremendously interesting to any of us that influenced by the academic job market.

Best Practice in Political Science (or Any Field)

Over the past year or so I've been getting more and more into network analysis--Both for its theoretical and methodological components.  For the most part, this methodological approach has not seen widespread use in political science, although network approaches are steadily growing.  Emilie Hafner-Burton, Miles Kahler, and Alexander Montgomery have a relatively recent article about this issue, although it deals primarily with the application of network methods to the field of international relations (which suits me just fine as I happen to be an IR guy). 

I had started reading some texts on network analysis last spring, and subsequent to taking an introductory course through ICPSR last summer, I've also been trying more and more to get some hands on experience with network tools and data--especially when I find papers that utilize network techniques and apply them to issues or topics found in IR.  I think this is probably one of the better ways to learn new methodological techniques, and as I suspect anyone in Binghamton's political science program will tell you, diving into a good replication project can be one of the best ways to familiarize yourself with new data, methods, etc.  It can also generate some important insights into how the field, and publication process more specifically, work. 

Anywho, I am really aiming at one particular interaction I had in pursuit of some replication data.  Upon contacting one of the authors in an attempt to obtain a copy of the data (who was very prompt in his reply, so the professional courtesy should not be ignored) I was informed that it "was not the norm in [his] field" to keep replication data.  This response got me thinking. 

The point of discussing network analysis at the beginning of this post was not only to provide some background info on my own interests, but to open up the issue of inter-disciplinary exchange.  Network methods have been largely the domain of sociology for the last 60-70 years or so.  I think their migration into other fields is fantastic, and that inter-disciplinary collaboration can be a valuable way to bring new insights into fields that can be rather isolated.  But this also raises the issue of to what extent, if at all, different disciplines view/approach their work in the same way, and what impact this may/may not have on inter-disciplinary collaboration and the diffusion of new methods/data. 

The individual that I had spoken to happened to be from a business department, and the paper focused on issues typically coming from the field of IR.  Not having gone to business school, I obviously can't attest to the ways in which the profession directs graduate students regarding what it is that they should be doing, and how they should be doing it.  So it strikes me that while business schools may use the same tools that we do (regression analyses and so forth) they do not view those tools in the same way that we in political science do.  Rather, while we generally acknowledge the shortcomings of our field, data, and approaches, we attempt to approach the process as a scientific one.  This includes maintaining copies of the data so that your own work can be made more transparent to other scholars.  I also don't mean to make this sound overly Idyllic--this is clearly not how it always works.  And I would invite readers with a greater knowledge of business programs to comment on this, but it seems to me that (if this one individual's comments are in fact reflective of the broader field) business programs do not view their "mission" or process in the same way.  It also seems like inter-disciplinary work can be greatly hampered by a lack of consensus on the best practices related to the use of data.  Even if the component data sets used are all already public, the individual coding rules and decisions made by the authors can greatly affect the results.  And without more detailed coding rules or replication data, it can be more difficult to determine what it is the authors did to get their results.  So when we are trying to grapple with methods that are coming from, or have been developed, primarily outside of our own field, this could be problematic. 

So does the way we view our approach really influence the ability to effectively collaborate with scholars from other fields?  Should the spread of new methods and data also be accompanied by a discussion on the appropriate standards for data management, whatever those are?  Does it even matter?