The Quantitative Peace

How Bruce Bueno de Mesquita buys a car

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita explains how to buy a car cheaply--something he mentioned on the Colbert Report this week:

 

 

The Colbert interview can be found here.

Stuff is still happening in (the sequel)...

I really don't know how many times I'll be able to use that title, but given that the American audience has become so distracted by the Washington debt ceiling battle, I decided to check on some old favorites and post a quick update on goings on elsewhere.  

Libya:  Apparently Libyan rebels have made "significant" gains in the past week, taking control of some key cities on the way to Tripoli.  NATO planes have damaged or destroyed over 150 targets in the past week alone.  However, who really knows what qualifies as a "military target" for these purposes.  Sources in the article also indicate that some of Ghadaffi's forces have begun consolidating in Tripoli and have begun removing their uniforms, apparently gearing up for a transition in tactics.  It will be interesting to see what the next month brings.  

Syria:  It sounds like the body count in Syria is continuing to rise steadily.  Syrian security forces are apparently combating "armed gangs" in an effort to protect the people.  This includes firing into Palestinian refugee camps as well it seems.  The article also mentions a Youtube video that has surfaced, purportedly showing some pretty graphic scenes from the crackdown.  I've not seen it, but it sounds pretty unsettling.  

Bahrain:  It sounds as though things have quieted down for the time being, but Bahrain is still dealing with the fallout from the previous protests and crackdowns.  Quiet doesn't necessarily mean good, however, as the BBC is reporting that hundreds of people are still in jail and there are reports of widespread torture.  Not terribly surprising, but it's important to keep in mind the fact that the violence carries on even once the streets have cleared.    

Debt Ceiling

This information comes from the Office of Management and Budget's Historical Tables of the US Government's budget.  Just some basic information on the debt ceiling that might put the current political wrangling into greater context.  I will add the usual disclaimer that this is not my usual playground, so if anyone catches any mistakes please let me know.

Below is a quick graphic illustrating the points at which the debt ceiling has been raised since 1940.  These figures have not been adjusted for inflation.  The dots show the point at which the debt ceiling was raised, or a point at which a previous raise in the debt ceiling was reaffirmed/extended, while the line is intended to give the viewer a better ability to connect the dots (so to speak).  

This second graph adjusted the previous figures for inflation (billions of 2009 dollars).

Of note---If my count is right, President Reagan increased the debt ceiling 18 times during his administration, from a starting point of $985 billion to $2.8 trillion.  The Clinton administration increased the debt limit 6 times from $4.3 trillion to $5.95 trillion.  The second Bush administration 7 times from $6.4 trillion to $11.3 trillion.  Of the data available (it only runs through 2009 here) the Obama administration increased the debt limit from $11.3 trillion to $12.1 trillion.  

The real point at which the debt ceiling seems to take off is during the Reagan administration.  Prior to this point government seemed to keep closer tabs on the debt limit---although there are several dots on the graphics above prior to the Reagan administration, many of these cases are simply reaffirming or briefly extending previous raises to the debt limit.  Others can probably speak to this in greater detail, but this seems to make sense given that the Reagan administration was characterized by unusually high peacetime military spending.  The second point at which the debt ceiling rises seems to be during the second Bush presidency.  This also seems to make sense given the tremendous levels of spending for the war on terror.  

Republicans have been campaigning on the fiscal irresponsibility of Democrats, but a cursory inspection of these charts suggest that recent Republican presidencies don't have a great track record of keeping the debt ceiling down.  Earlier Republican presidencies (Eisenhower, Nixon, and Ford) seem to have been better at this.  That said, this does not take into account a host of other factors (international crises, which party controls Congress, divided government, etc.) so this is far from conclusive.  Still, if the argument is that the president is accountable for what happens on their watch then the fact remains that Republican presidents have presided over the greatest increases in the debt ceiling.    

Update

Between dissertating, data collection, and side projects, blogging has been pretty lite here lately.  I'll try to keep up with the occasional updates so as not to dissappoint our loyal reader...

Protests continue in Syria.

France drops arms to Libyan rebels.  What's particularly interesting about this event (a couple days old I admit) is the notion that the French are reported to have made the arms drops on their own and without informing NATO allies.  France has been one of the more belligerent of the NATO allies involved in the operations in Libya, so this isn't too surprising.  I'm just wondering what this says about the dynamics between NATO allies.  Without going into too much depth on the issue I think there are two immediately apparent possibilities: 1) NATO is ill-suited for serious coordination and control of ally behvior during military operations, or 2) Given the pattern of escalation that has we've seen so far (recall the French and British deployments of attack helicopters to Libya) having a "loose cannon" of sorts can be advantageous.  That said, this latter point does not necessarily preclude the first point.  That is, NATO may very well be poorly equipped to seriously coordinate allied actions, but having a loose cannon can still be desirable so long as it happens to mesh well with the preferences of those states involved.

As we can imagine, however, some states have protested France's actions on this matter. 

Talks are under way in Bahrain.  

The Targeting of Corporate Executives

I came across this article from Defense News yesterday, and the topic is something that I have not come across before.  The gist of the article is that a Pakistani branch of al-Qaeda, or at least with members affiliated with al-Qaeda, was planning the assassination of Lockheed Martin's CEO.

More after the jump...

Evolution, Secrecy, and Bureaucracies

This sort of reminds me of this.  Really one passage in particular, I suppose:

We tend to marvel at the Darwinian perfection of organisms now, saying 'this must have been highly selected for, it's a tuned and sophisticated machine'.  In fact, it's a mess - there's so much unnecessary complexity.

Bear with me.  The preceding passage is from an article I found on the BBC regarding flaws in proteins that are believed to be linked to more complex biological structure emerging.  While not directly related to Walt's post on bureaucracies, the passage quoted above just sort of struck me as appropriate.

Walt's basic argument is that America's foreign policy, being one that he generally describes as imperialistic, could not be sustained without a large and complex bureaucratic organism that can manage foreign policy activity.  These bureaucracies, Walt argues, are more prone to secrecy because it makes the perpetuation of American foreign policy easier.  Basically, secrecy allows bureaucratic actors to pursue their own policy preferences and use the tactics and strategies that they want to use.  Without secrecy the public may find out about the reprehensible policies that bureaucrats are employing and put a stop to it.

Like the preceding passage, Walt's argument seems to assume that the functions of the bureaucracy are finely tuned and selected for because they better enable the bureaucracy to do its job.  The first mistake here is treating the national security bureaucracy (as he refers to it) as a monolithic entity that controls foreign policy.  Indeed, one of the core elements of bureaucratic politics theory is the existence of multiple bureaucratic agencies, all with their own particular mission/mandate, and that are often "competing" with one another to influence the direction of foreign policy.  These theoretical models often focus on the individuals within these bureaucratic agencies, arguing that membership in a particular agency, previous experience, and one's rank within the organization all determine views and preferences.  It may be more appropriate to say that these factors partially shape preferences, and partially determine the extent to which an individual can pursue their preferences.  The "previous baggage" component suggests that preferences are partially determined by factors other than an individual affiliation with a particular agency.  Nevertheless, bureaucratic politics theory assumes that these individuals will seek to enhance their own standing and, as a result, the standing of their organization within the broader organizational context (i.e. the Pentagon/DOD will try to maximize its influence within the broader foreign policymaking community).    

Now I don't doubt that some of these bureaucratic actors enjoy having a certain level of secrecy associated with their work, as Walt suggests.  This surely opens up opportunities to do things that would not otherwise be possible if these actors were subject to a higher level of public scrutiny.  But I think one mistake is thinking that this is all completely deliberate.  The redundancy of bureaucratic functions likely accounts for a substantial amount of the secrecy that exists in the American foreign policymaking "apparatus."  Since there are multiple organizations all competing for influence within the system there is a strong incentive to not share information with those actors/organizations that are perceived to be your competitors.  The FBI, CIA, NSA, DIA, and other intelligence gathering agencies are in many ways rivals when it comes to gathering intelligence.  Indeed this was argued to be a major problem in the wake of the September 11 attacks.  The solution?  Create the Department of Homeland Security and the Director of National Intelligence to oversee much of the broader intelligence and security community.  

The result?  The CIA, who had arguably been top-dog in this field prior to the creation of the DNI is still far more entrenched in the national security bureaucracy than the newly created DNI.  This is largely due to path dependence and the fact that the CIA had 60 years to establish its own contacts and relations with other agencies.  Again we see the CIA in a position where there are strong incentives to jealously guard any agency-exclusive information in an effort to stave off the DNI's growing influence.  The CIA is therefore in a position to undertake its own operations and only report successes once they have become, well, successful.  Failures of course should never see the light of day.

Now this may sound a lot like what Walt is proposing.  However, the major difference is that a great deal of secrecy is introduced into the system as a byproduct of other actions---not because a high level of secrecy is optimal for the pursuit of some foreign policy goal.  This secrecy also exists in an intra-governmental fashion, and is not simply an issue of external transparency.  Again, as we have seen over the past few years, and as many folks have argued, the refusal to share information between government agencies has resulted in a decidedly suboptimal system for ensuring our national security.

The current bureaucratic structure has not evolved, its characteristics have not been selected for, because it is the best suited system for pursuing national security.  Certainly policymakers, while delegating substantial powers to the actors within these agencies, can face very negative consequences when bad policies or tactics are uncovered, so internal transparency is not necessarily desirable for political leaders either.  The creation of the DNI and Homeland Security have definitely increased the size of the national security bureaucracy, and have probably increased the level of secrecy in the system, but I don't think this is the intent.  These agencies were created in an effort to facilitate communication between other agencies in the system and to keep political leaders better informed.  While I don't totally disagree with Walt's assessment, I think there are probably some more nuanced organizational factors that contribute a great deal to our understanding of why we see the structures and behavior that we see.    

 

Love Triangle

It's been an otherwise quiet week here, but I just came across this article at the BBC.  With all of the dust that the killing of bin Laden stirred up between the US and Pakistan it's easy to forget the bigger picture.  Specifically, what openings (if any) does the increased tension between the US and Pakistan create for other states in the region?  

The article specifically mentions that China may be able to use this opportunity to increase its foreign investment in Pakistan.  First, I guess it's not immediately clear to me why Pakistani--US relations have to fray in order for China to increase its investment.  I suspect the overwhelming majority of US aid to Pakistan is directed at enhancing Pakistan's military and intelligence capabilities.  On the other hand, China's investment seems to be infrastructural as well as military.  Indeed, the BBC article indicates that China is Pakistan's largest supplier of arms, but does the US necessarily see this relationship as a competitive one?  In the context of the last decade or so, Chinese aid to Pakistan could certainly be seen as supplementing US efforts at bolstering the strength of Pakistan's central government.  

The US has a very obvious agenda with respect to Pakistan, and I'm not so naive as to believe that there aren't concerns over rival sources of external influence making it more difficult for the US to acheive its goals.  That said, I'm not so sure that China's goals might not be very similar.  Sure, the Chinese are probably trying to increase their own regional power bloc, and cozying up to Pakistan is a natural way to increase Chinese power vis-a-vis India, but the Chinese government is probably no more eager to see the government in Pakistan collapse than the US government is.  In the short term, such a collapse would potentially create some serious problems for the Chinese in securing their western borders.  Any such collapse could very well devolve into a protracted conflict that could easily spill over into China's territory.  In the long term, this sort of collapse puts a nuclear powered state on China's borders into some potentially very unfriendly hands.   

Is this a place where there is some potential for the US to scale back on its commitments with less cost than we might initially think?  I think the immediate reaction is to view the situation in terms of dyadic relations between the US and Pakistan.  But viewed in the broader regional context, is it possible that the US is (sort of) indirectly helping China shirk what would otherwise be a greater burden to their own government but acting as if the burden is all ours?  I know many pundits, politicians, and policy wonks (just one example here) have warned against cutting aid to Pakistan as it would have disastrous effects, but could it be that cutting aid to Pakistan would not really harm the US' interests in the region that much?  Indeed, could it be possible that US strategic interests are actually enhanced by such a move, as it may prompt the Chinese to take a greater share of the burden for ensuring that Pakistan remains stable, thus occupying more of their resources and attention?

I'm not a regional expert, so it's certainly possible that I'm missing something.  Thoughts? 

Quick Word on Elite Actors

Dan Drezner has the most recent in a line of posts discussing the role of elites vs. masses in policymaking (See Drezner for links to the other posts in the series--they're worth reading).

I don't really have much to add to the pile here--these are some pretty smart folks and they've said a lot of good things already.  I just have a couple of thoughts:

1. With respect to Drezner's question, "who are the elites?" I think they tend to encompass both the policy mandarins and the lobbyists/special interests.  In fact, the line in this area is quite blurred.  I've been spending a great deal of time over the past year dealing with these sorts of actors in my own work, and the in-and-outer reputation is definitely not exaggerated by any means.  Certainly there are a lot of careerists who never leave Washington, but there are just as many folks who hop from policymaking to private/corporate leadership and back again.  In the 1930s and 1940s a lot of the bureaucrats shaping American foreign policy came from long stints in corporate or legal America--something that still happens today, although there is some greater variance with respect to the backgrounds of these sorts of people.  The point here is that the when identifying elites the line between public and private sectors may not be all that accurate.  That said, I do think we need some sort of criteria with which to define inclusion into the group--otherwise it's impossible to discuss them and their role.  
2. I also agree that IR generally doesn't have a great sense of how policy issues interact with one another to shape decisions.  We control for the influence of security-related issues in our regression models that examine the impact of economic interests on foreign policy decisions* but this doesn't really tell us a lot about how and when these two areas "compete" with one another, so to speak.  Rather, all we're getting from coefficients in these models are the average effects of each category/variable, and it's entirely possible that their relative influence shifts over time in response to different environmental factors--whether they be domestic or international.  Drezner doesn't talk about this specifically, but I think that's sort of what he's getting at when he discusses the possibility that elites act on behalf of special interests in some situations, but push back against them in others.  
3. A single, united elite?  Nope.  I also agree with Drezner regarding the notion that these elite actors we often discuss are far from being a single cohesive group with homogeneous preferences.  And I think it's here that Drezner raises one of the more difficult aspects of the elite-mass discussion--specifically, that public opinion can be both a cause and consequence of elite actions.  After the recent death of bin Laden, many pundits began speculating as to whether or not national security was off the table in the 2012 elections, but former Powell protege Lawrence Wilkerson had the following to say in response to this question:

Well, I hope so.  I doubt it, though, because my Republican party will make that issue a big one, and they will find plenty of room to attack in, and create that room if it‘s not there.  After all, we‘ve got Rush Limbaugh out there making the most absurd statements you could possibly imagine about this incident. 

This certainly seems to indicate that the party leadership is aware of its own ability to shape the broader narrative.  I also think one of the most surprising things about this event was just how quickly it became politicized.  This really shouldn't surprise me, but it did.  Either way, this sort of addresses Drezner's point about when elites get along and when they don't.  If there is an electoral gain to be had, elites seem to have no problem creating an issue where the public may perceive none.    

Just because I've spent so much time dealing with the early Cold War period lately, I'll whip out another tried and true example--the Marshall Plan, although remembered as this valiant American effort to ensure peace and prosperity, was really pushed on a reluctant public by elite political actors.  Congressional leadership was certainly divided on this issue at the outset.  In fact, nothing about the half-decade after World War II was obvious to the American public.  Many people still considered Russia to be a wartime ally well beyond the point where most elite policymakers became convinced that cooperation was impossible.

To go back briefly to the first point above regarding the backgrounds of elite actors, I also think this sort of information is important because it sheds some light on when elite preference will converge/diverge.  This is far from a perfect indicator, but it's possible that this sort of professional and geographic information can shed some light on the factors that shape the individual preferences of elite foreign policy actors--at least for those who do not offer up votes on a regular and public basis.  Gelpi and Feaver have a piece that gets at some of these dynamics with respect to previous military service and the use of force.  I like to think that my current work will help to further this line of research, but only time shall tell I suppose.    

*  Regarding the point above, this distinction between economic and security is something that is very very blurry, and I'm not entirely convinced the two ever really exist as exclusive entities.  

  

Linear Time and Games

I am glad to see someone has taken the opening episode of Deep Space 9 and created a clip of one of the more theoretically interesting segments of the episode.  Granted, this was uploaded 4 years ago, but I had not come across a short version of the clip until now. 

I watched the show when I was in middle/high school and had the opportunity to rewatch it all the way through when we picked up the complete series a few years ago.  While the longer story arcs are compelling and the show gains some decent steam in the 4 and 5th season, much of it is not digestable for a class (unless I am teaching "The Politics of Star Trek"). Unlike traditional Star Trek series (Original, ST:TNG), much of the better stories are not episodic.

The clip features Commander (not quite a Captain yet) Sisko explaining to wormhole aliens the utility of living in linear time - the aliens experience time simultaneously.

 

 

With the proper context, this can make it into a game theory lecture.

 

Welcome Aboard!

The title is slightly inappropriate, as Italy had previously decided to send military advisors to Libya.  Maybe we should say welcome more aboad, or welcome aboard again.  Well...whatever.  The point is Britain and France had previously been pleading with their NATO allies for more support in the air campaign to remove Ghadaffi from power and replace his autocracy with a "democratic government" protect civilians.  But now the Italians have decided to contribute some planes to the campaign to help out their British and French pals.

I don't know what the recent media climate has been like in Italy, but with Berlusconi's troubles lately, I have to wonder if we're observing an example of that elusive animal---the diversionary use of force.  Or, maybe it's simply a desire to exert more control over a conflict that has been having some less than desirable spillover effects on states that are geographically proximate to the turmoil unfoling in North Africa.  I think events over the past couple of weeks have continued to add some support for what others have previously made note of regarding the effects of immigration on decisions to partake in the Libyan intervention (See these links for previous comments on this subject by Steve Saideman and Phil Arena).