The Quantitative Peace

Evolution, Secrecy, and Bureaucracies

This sort of reminds me of this.  Really one passage in particular, I suppose:

We tend to marvel at the Darwinian perfection of organisms now, saying 'this must have been highly selected for, it's a tuned and sophisticated machine'.  In fact, it's a mess - there's so much unnecessary complexity.

Bear with me.  The preceding passage is from an article I found on the BBC regarding flaws in proteins that are believed to be linked to more complex biological structure emerging.  While not directly related to Walt's post on bureaucracies, the passage quoted above just sort of struck me as appropriate.

Walt's basic argument is that America's foreign policy, being one that he generally describes as imperialistic, could not be sustained without a large and complex bureaucratic organism that can manage foreign policy activity.  These bureaucracies, Walt argues, are more prone to secrecy because it makes the perpetuation of American foreign policy easier.  Basically, secrecy allows bureaucratic actors to pursue their own policy preferences and use the tactics and strategies that they want to use.  Without secrecy the public may find out about the reprehensible policies that bureaucrats are employing and put a stop to it.

Like the preceding passage, Walt's argument seems to assume that the functions of the bureaucracy are finely tuned and selected for because they better enable the bureaucracy to do its job.  The first mistake here is treating the national security bureaucracy (as he refers to it) as a monolithic entity that controls foreign policy.  Indeed, one of the core elements of bureaucratic politics theory is the existence of multiple bureaucratic agencies, all with their own particular mission/mandate, and that are often "competing" with one another to influence the direction of foreign policy.  These theoretical models often focus on the individuals within these bureaucratic agencies, arguing that membership in a particular agency, previous experience, and one's rank within the organization all determine views and preferences.  It may be more appropriate to say that these factors partially shape preferences, and partially determine the extent to which an individual can pursue their preferences.  The "previous baggage" component suggests that preferences are partially determined by factors other than an individual affiliation with a particular agency.  Nevertheless, bureaucratic politics theory assumes that these individuals will seek to enhance their own standing and, as a result, the standing of their organization within the broader organizational context (i.e. the Pentagon/DOD will try to maximize its influence within the broader foreign policymaking community).    

Now I don't doubt that some of these bureaucratic actors enjoy having a certain level of secrecy associated with their work, as Walt suggests.  This surely opens up opportunities to do things that would not otherwise be possible if these actors were subject to a higher level of public scrutiny.  But I think one mistake is thinking that this is all completely deliberate.  The redundancy of bureaucratic functions likely accounts for a substantial amount of the secrecy that exists in the American foreign policymaking "apparatus."  Since there are multiple organizations all competing for influence within the system there is a strong incentive to not share information with those actors/organizations that are perceived to be your competitors.  The FBI, CIA, NSA, DIA, and other intelligence gathering agencies are in many ways rivals when it comes to gathering intelligence.  Indeed this was argued to be a major problem in the wake of the September 11 attacks.  The solution?  Create the Department of Homeland Security and the Director of National Intelligence to oversee much of the broader intelligence and security community.  

The result?  The CIA, who had arguably been top-dog in this field prior to the creation of the DNI is still far more entrenched in the national security bureaucracy than the newly created DNI.  This is largely due to path dependence and the fact that the CIA had 60 years to establish its own contacts and relations with other agencies.  Again we see the CIA in a position where there are strong incentives to jealously guard any agency-exclusive information in an effort to stave off the DNI's growing influence.  The CIA is therefore in a position to undertake its own operations and only report successes once they have become, well, successful.  Failures of course should never see the light of day.

Now this may sound a lot like what Walt is proposing.  However, the major difference is that a great deal of secrecy is introduced into the system as a byproduct of other actions---not because a high level of secrecy is optimal for the pursuit of some foreign policy goal.  This secrecy also exists in an intra-governmental fashion, and is not simply an issue of external transparency.  Again, as we have seen over the past few years, and as many folks have argued, the refusal to share information between government agencies has resulted in a decidedly suboptimal system for ensuring our national security.

The current bureaucratic structure has not evolved, its characteristics have not been selected for, because it is the best suited system for pursuing national security.  Certainly policymakers, while delegating substantial powers to the actors within these agencies, can face very negative consequences when bad policies or tactics are uncovered, so internal transparency is not necessarily desirable for political leaders either.  The creation of the DNI and Homeland Security have definitely increased the size of the national security bureaucracy, and have probably increased the level of secrecy in the system, but I don't think this is the intent.  These agencies were created in an effort to facilitate communication between other agencies in the system and to keep political leaders better informed.  While I don't totally disagree with Walt's assessment, I think there are probably some more nuanced organizational factors that contribute a great deal to our understanding of why we see the structures and behavior that we see.    

 

Love Triangle

It's been an otherwise quiet week here, but I just came across this article at the BBC.  With all of the dust that the killing of bin Laden stirred up between the US and Pakistan it's easy to forget the bigger picture.  Specifically, what openings (if any) does the increased tension between the US and Pakistan create for other states in the region?  

The article specifically mentions that China may be able to use this opportunity to increase its foreign investment in Pakistan.  First, I guess it's not immediately clear to me why Pakistani--US relations have to fray in order for China to increase its investment.  I suspect the overwhelming majority of US aid to Pakistan is directed at enhancing Pakistan's military and intelligence capabilities.  On the other hand, China's investment seems to be infrastructural as well as military.  Indeed, the BBC article indicates that China is Pakistan's largest supplier of arms, but does the US necessarily see this relationship as a competitive one?  In the context of the last decade or so, Chinese aid to Pakistan could certainly be seen as supplementing US efforts at bolstering the strength of Pakistan's central government.  

The US has a very obvious agenda with respect to Pakistan, and I'm not so naive as to believe that there aren't concerns over rival sources of external influence making it more difficult for the US to acheive its goals.  That said, I'm not so sure that China's goals might not be very similar.  Sure, the Chinese are probably trying to increase their own regional power bloc, and cozying up to Pakistan is a natural way to increase Chinese power vis-a-vis India, but the Chinese government is probably no more eager to see the government in Pakistan collapse than the US government is.  In the short term, such a collapse would potentially create some serious problems for the Chinese in securing their western borders.  Any such collapse could very well devolve into a protracted conflict that could easily spill over into China's territory.  In the long term, this sort of collapse puts a nuclear powered state on China's borders into some potentially very unfriendly hands.   

Is this a place where there is some potential for the US to scale back on its commitments with less cost than we might initially think?  I think the immediate reaction is to view the situation in terms of dyadic relations between the US and Pakistan.  But viewed in the broader regional context, is it possible that the US is (sort of) indirectly helping China shirk what would otherwise be a greater burden to their own government but acting as if the burden is all ours?  I know many pundits, politicians, and policy wonks (just one example here) have warned against cutting aid to Pakistan as it would have disastrous effects, but could it be that cutting aid to Pakistan would not really harm the US' interests in the region that much?  Indeed, could it be possible that US strategic interests are actually enhanced by such a move, as it may prompt the Chinese to take a greater share of the burden for ensuring that Pakistan remains stable, thus occupying more of their resources and attention?

I'm not a regional expert, so it's certainly possible that I'm missing something.  Thoughts? 

Quick Word on Elite Actors

Dan Drezner has the most recent in a line of posts discussing the role of elites vs. masses in policymaking (See Drezner for links to the other posts in the series--they're worth reading).

I don't really have much to add to the pile here--these are some pretty smart folks and they've said a lot of good things already.  I just have a couple of thoughts:

1. With respect to Drezner's question, "who are the elites?" I think they tend to encompass both the policy mandarins and the lobbyists/special interests.  In fact, the line in this area is quite blurred.  I've been spending a great deal of time over the past year dealing with these sorts of actors in my own work, and the in-and-outer reputation is definitely not exaggerated by any means.  Certainly there are a lot of careerists who never leave Washington, but there are just as many folks who hop from policymaking to private/corporate leadership and back again.  In the 1930s and 1940s a lot of the bureaucrats shaping American foreign policy came from long stints in corporate or legal America--something that still happens today, although there is some greater variance with respect to the backgrounds of these sorts of people.  The point here is that the when identifying elites the line between public and private sectors may not be all that accurate.  That said, I do think we need some sort of criteria with which to define inclusion into the group--otherwise it's impossible to discuss them and their role.  
2. I also agree that IR generally doesn't have a great sense of how policy issues interact with one another to shape decisions.  We control for the influence of security-related issues in our regression models that examine the impact of economic interests on foreign policy decisions* but this doesn't really tell us a lot about how and when these two areas "compete" with one another, so to speak.  Rather, all we're getting from coefficients in these models are the average effects of each category/variable, and it's entirely possible that their relative influence shifts over time in response to different environmental factors--whether they be domestic or international.  Drezner doesn't talk about this specifically, but I think that's sort of what he's getting at when he discusses the possibility that elites act on behalf of special interests in some situations, but push back against them in others.  
3. A single, united elite?  Nope.  I also agree with Drezner regarding the notion that these elite actors we often discuss are far from being a single cohesive group with homogeneous preferences.  And I think it's here that Drezner raises one of the more difficult aspects of the elite-mass discussion--specifically, that public opinion can be both a cause and consequence of elite actions.  After the recent death of bin Laden, many pundits began speculating as to whether or not national security was off the table in the 2012 elections, but former Powell protege Lawrence Wilkerson had the following to say in response to this question:

Well, I hope so.  I doubt it, though, because my Republican party will make that issue a big one, and they will find plenty of room to attack in, and create that room if it‘s not there.  After all, we‘ve got Rush Limbaugh out there making the most absurd statements you could possibly imagine about this incident. 

This certainly seems to indicate that the party leadership is aware of its own ability to shape the broader narrative.  I also think one of the most surprising things about this event was just how quickly it became politicized.  This really shouldn't surprise me, but it did.  Either way, this sort of addresses Drezner's point about when elites get along and when they don't.  If there is an electoral gain to be had, elites seem to have no problem creating an issue where the public may perceive none.    

Just because I've spent so much time dealing with the early Cold War period lately, I'll whip out another tried and true example--the Marshall Plan, although remembered as this valiant American effort to ensure peace and prosperity, was really pushed on a reluctant public by elite political actors.  Congressional leadership was certainly divided on this issue at the outset.  In fact, nothing about the half-decade after World War II was obvious to the American public.  Many people still considered Russia to be a wartime ally well beyond the point where most elite policymakers became convinced that cooperation was impossible.

To go back briefly to the first point above regarding the backgrounds of elite actors, I also think this sort of information is important because it sheds some light on when elite preference will converge/diverge.  This is far from a perfect indicator, but it's possible that this sort of professional and geographic information can shed some light on the factors that shape the individual preferences of elite foreign policy actors--at least for those who do not offer up votes on a regular and public basis.  Gelpi and Feaver have a piece that gets at some of these dynamics with respect to previous military service and the use of force.  I like to think that my current work will help to further this line of research, but only time shall tell I suppose.    

*  Regarding the point above, this distinction between economic and security is something that is very very blurry, and I'm not entirely convinced the two ever really exist as exclusive entities.  

  

Linear Time and Games

I am glad to see someone has taken the opening episode of Deep Space 9 and created a clip of one of the more theoretically interesting segments of the episode.  Granted, this was uploaded 4 years ago, but I had not come across a short version of the clip until now. 

I watched the show when I was in middle/high school and had the opportunity to rewatch it all the way through when we picked up the complete series a few years ago.  While the longer story arcs are compelling and the show gains some decent steam in the 4 and 5th season, much of it is not digestable for a class (unless I am teaching "The Politics of Star Trek"). Unlike traditional Star Trek series (Original, ST:TNG), much of the better stories are not episodic.

The clip features Commander (not quite a Captain yet) Sisko explaining to wormhole aliens the utility of living in linear time - the aliens experience time simultaneously.

 

 

With the proper context, this can make it into a game theory lecture.

 

Welcome Aboard!

The title is slightly inappropriate, as Italy had previously decided to send military advisors to Libya.  Maybe we should say welcome more aboad, or welcome aboard again.  Well...whatever.  The point is Britain and France had previously been pleading with their NATO allies for more support in the air campaign to remove Ghadaffi from power and replace his autocracy with a "democratic government" protect civilians.  But now the Italians have decided to contribute some planes to the campaign to help out their British and French pals.

I don't know what the recent media climate has been like in Italy, but with Berlusconi's troubles lately, I have to wonder if we're observing an example of that elusive animal---the diversionary use of force.  Or, maybe it's simply a desire to exert more control over a conflict that has been having some less than desirable spillover effects on states that are geographically proximate to the turmoil unfoling in North Africa.  I think events over the past couple of weeks have continued to add some support for what others have previously made note of regarding the effects of immigration on decisions to partake in the Libyan intervention (See these links for previous comments on this subject by Steve Saideman and Phil Arena).

Healthcare Incentives

I've apparently been sitting on this post for a while, so this might be (is quite literally) old news for many out there.  It's an op-ed piece from The New York Times from a few months back on the healthcare legislation (No, this it not about IR).   

What caught my eye was at the end of the article when he starts talking about the incentives created by mandating that people obtain health insurance.  The gist of it is that in spite of all of the cries about this legislation representing the onslaught of the communist hoards, this kind of legislation might actually help to promote the capitalist spirit.  Leonhardt (the author) argues that ensuring that everyone has access to decent healthcare and retirement will allow/encourage individuals to take greater risks than they otherwise would.  When individuals get healthcare primarily through their employer, and when individual premiums are generally through the roof, thereby leading many healthy people to not buy insurance if they don't already have it, people will be more reluctant to leave the safety of their cushy corporate or government job for the sake of starting up a business.  Leaving that job means having to provide yourself with insurance at a much higher cost, and this is something that those with a family may be especially reluctant to do.

I think this article has two particularly interesting points.  1) It challenges the typical narrative that surrounds the healthcare by offering a third view, asserting that this does not have to be a zero-sum game between fans of the free-market and fans of social welfare programs, and 2) offers a decent example of the potentially counterintuitive effects that some legislation might have.  

One problem that I have with this argument is that it assumes most individuals are generally worried about the provision of healthcare for their families, and seems to ignore that other important aspect that employment carries---money.  While ensuring your children's health coverage is certainly important, putting food on the table is also important.  If one parent's income can provide for the family so the other parent can give a crack at starting a new company, then that's great.  However, I suspect that many people would still be reluctant to leave their jobs knowing that this will potentially slice their family income in half.  Even if everyone is still covered by the spouse's workplace coverage, that's a pretty big gamble.  This does not mean that Leonhardt's argument is wrong per se, but that it may simply apply to a much smaller subsample of the population than he makes it sound.  I would imagine that this would also have some minor effect in increasing the unemployment rate, if we assume that of all the folks that do decide to take this gamble, the majority will not succeed in starting up a successful business.     

I think this is a generally incomplete picture, but fundamentally serves as a decent example of how the effects of legislation can be counterintuitive because they alter the basic incentive structures that people face.  Granted, it will take several years to find out if the legislation has ever had these sorts of effects.

 

Does language change the way we play games?

A friend posted a link to a list of 20 words that were not directly translatable into the English language. Most of the words appear to come from Altalang.com, a website that focuses on linguistics and understanding. A few highlights include:

 

• Ilunga: Tshiluba (Southwest Congo) – A word famous for its untranslatability, most professional translators pinpoint it as the stature of a person “who is ready to forgive and forget any first abuse, tolerate it the second time, but never forgive nor tolerate on the third offense.”
• Tingo: Pascuense (Easter Island) – Hopefully this isn’t a word you’d need often: “the act of taking objects one desires from the house of a friend by gradually borrowing all of them.”

 

While the initial posts were relatively old, my digging came across a much more interesting column from a year ago that surveys the literature on the word "fair" and if it is translatable into non-English languages.  This has some obvious, potential impliciations for game theoretic treatments such as the ultimatum game.

Finally Choosing Sides, Huh?

This isn't terribly surprising, but it seems that some NATO states have finally made their preferences publicly known.  The UK is sending a small group of military advisors to Libya to...well, advise, and train Libyan rebels.  This is apparently part of a joint British and French operation.  

I don't think it was a secret that most of the states involved in the intervention in Libya wanted Ghadaffi gone---They have said as much.  However, I think most of these states expected that their objective could be achieved under the guise of acting on a UN mandate, whereas the prolonged fighting has now led these states to a point where they must become more directly involved to achieve their desired outcome.  What will be interesting to observe is how far they are willing to go---the rebels have seemed to be on a seesaw over the past few weeks, and their victory (whatever that looks like) is far from guaranteed. 

NATO has already been calling for additional jets, suggesting that their resources are fairly limited (apparently no other NATO partners are willing to pitch in any more).  Although, this may simply be the British and the French wishing for their gradual escalation of involvement in Libya to appear more multilateral than it really is.  Alternatively, it may be that the British and the French, having exposed their enthusiasm for removing Ghadaffi, have sent a signal to their partners regarding their willingness to carry the weight.  Hmm...Some guy wrote about this sort of thing once...  In any event, it seems that there are increasing costs to the British in the French in terms of manpower and material, or, possibly in terms of reputational costs. 

Mr. Y. is no Mr. X.

I've been meaning to say something about this for a while now, but happen to be a little late to the show.  A couple of weeks ago two Marine Corps officers, whom I presume are members of the joint staff, released an article under the pseudonym "Mr. Y.," harkening back to George Kennan's "X" article in Foreign Affairs.  In a nutshell, their article attempts to provide a broad conceptual framework through which America's role in global affairs can be viewed through the next century.  John Norris at FP has some comments on the piece for those who are interested.  I have a few thoughts of my own...

Chinese Military Capabilities

Interesting article from Defense News on US-Chinese relations.  The US CINC of Pacific Command has noted that Chinese naval forces have seemed less aggressive this year than they were last year, and offers a couple of explanations for why.  I have some thoughts on these explanations, but there is one other point that I also find particularly interesting: