The Quantitative Peace

Organized violence in Africa, 1989-2010

Ralph Sundberg at the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) sent me this video they put together displaying organized violence in Africa for a 21 year time period:

The data can be found here: http://ucdp.uu.se/ged/

2010 CIRI Human Rights Data Project Report

The CIRI Human Rights Data Project, of which I am a part, released its 2010 data last weekend.  A report pointing out interesting patterns can be viewed over at the CIRI Blog.  One interesting bit:

The CIRI Index of Physical Integrity Rights measures a government's overall level of respect for four rights: torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, disappearance. The index ranges from 0 (no respect for any of these four rights) to 8 (full respect for all four of these rights). In 2008-2009, the world saw an overall average increase in these rights of .047. However, a reversal of this improvement was seen from 2009-2010, with it's overall average decline in respect of -.031...An important part of this overall decline in respect for physical integrity rights comes from a continuing degradation, globally, of respect for the right not to be tortured. For example, 2009-2010 saw 17 countries engage in more torture, while only 8 engaged in less torture...This trend in the greater use of torture is not a post-9/11 phenomenon, however. The chart below shows the increased use of torture beginning in the early 1980s. The extent of the drop in respect for this right differed by region and is seen to be particularly acute in Africa.

This is particularly interesting when combined with the fact that, according to CIRI, political imprisonment has become less common over the same time period.  Off the top of my head, I would probably attribute these changes to substitution of one form of repression for the other.  It seems likely that, as information on human rights abuses has become more widespread, governments have engaged less in the physical integrity rights violation that is the hardest to publicly deny (political imprisonment) and more in a form of repression that is much more clandestine (torture).  This seems especially plausible to me since one of the world's greatest publicizers of human rights abuses, Amnesty International, began its life as an organization primarily committed to supporting and publicizing the plight of "prisoners of conscience" worldwide.  Over time, the cost of engaging in political imprisonment may very well have become high enough to make other, less visible forms of repression more attractive.

Of course, there are many alternative explanations for these changes, and there is a lot of work that remains to be done in terms of developing theories of state repression.  This simply stands out as one of the many empirical puzzles that remain to be solved for those of us interested in studying government respect for human rights.  In the meantime, check out the CIRI Human Rights Data at http://www.humanrightsdata.org and the CIRI blog at http://humanrightsdata.blogspot.com/.

 

That's the Spirit!

In spite of the massive flooding in Binghamton, I'm finding some time to focus on something else.  

So hey, remember the debt deal?  Sure you do.  Well things are already off to a great start with that bipartisan commission.  Apparently Senator John Kyl is threatening to leave the bipartisan commission if defense spending remains on the table.  Kyl says that even Defense Secretary Panetta, and former Secretary Gates said enough was enough on defense cuts.  

In fact, I'm pretty sure that's not what Panetta said.  I'm pretty sure Panetta has said that up to $350 billion more would be feasible.  Beyond that and security might take a hit. As I understand it, Panetta was saying that beyond what was already cut as a part of the debt deal, an additional $350 billion over ten years could be cut.  

So what does Kyl get out of this?  Didn't he get the memo?  Bipartisanship is IN!  Oh, that's right...

If the 12-person congressional committee fails to come up with a plan to make those additional cuts, that would trigger $600 billion in defense-spending reductions. And Arizona is one of the top half-dozen or so states in the nation in terms of the defense industry's footprint.

The industry already has felt the ripple effect of military efforts to wind down the U.S. presence in Iraq. After leveling off in 2009, Defense Department contracts in Arizona in fiscal 2010 dropped nearly 19 percent, to about $10 billion.

Defense and aerospace manufacturers employ about 37,000 Arizonans who earned $3.1 billion in salaries in 2008, according to the chamber's figures.

The Army, Air Force, Marine Corps and National Guard also employ 45,000 military and civilian personnel at nine Arizona military installations.

First, I guess it's possible that Kyl really wants an excuse to be off the panel.  I really can't imagine defense cuts not being on the table in some form or another, and perhaps he's reluctant to be associated with the cuts that he know are inevitably coming down the line.  Would he really gain any political points for quitting?  Second, and alternatively, wouldn't Kyl be better off remaining on the panel to curb the potential losses that Arizona faces?  Yes, there may be cuts, but could he effectively argue that those cuts would have been worse for Arizona had he not been there to guard against them?  

Ultimately I guess this comes down to whether or not his threat to leave the panel is credible.  What am I missing here?   

Bipartisanship and foreign policy

Kindred Winecoff has a post up regarding a post by Matt Yglesias on the level of partisanship in American politics.  I've some thoughts on the issue.  I should also stipulate that I'm coming at this from a strictly foreign policy-oriented perspective.  Some of this bleeds over into domestic politics, but I'm sure there's a lot that I'm not covering by approaching the topic from this point of view.

Libya Update (the sequal)

Given the post from last week, I'm somewhat surprised that this has happened so fast.  There was some speculation that the scrapping of uniforms by Ghadaffi's soldiers meant that the battle into Tripoli would be a long and drawn out affair, as Ghadaffi loyalists geared up for more of an insurgency-style campaign against the rebels.  However, it's also possible that they were just ditching the uniforms so as to not get killed.  Either scenario is plausible, and the reality is probably a mixture of the two.  Anywho, I had just a couple of thoughts as to where we go from here.

Stuff is still happening in (the sequel)...

I really don't know how many times I'll be able to use that title, but given that the American audience has become so distracted by the Washington debt ceiling battle, I decided to check on some old favorites and post a quick update on goings on elsewhere.  

Libya:  Apparently Libyan rebels have made "significant" gains in the past week, taking control of some key cities on the way to Tripoli.  NATO planes have damaged or destroyed over 150 targets in the past week alone.  However, who really knows what qualifies as a "military target" for these purposes.  Sources in the article also indicate that some of Ghadaffi's forces have begun consolidating in Tripoli and have begun removing their uniforms, apparently gearing up for a transition in tactics.  It will be interesting to see what the next month brings.  

Syria:  It sounds like the body count in Syria is continuing to rise steadily.  Syrian security forces are apparently combating "armed gangs" in an effort to protect the people.  This includes firing into Palestinian refugee camps as well it seems.  The article also mentions a Youtube video that has surfaced, purportedly showing some pretty graphic scenes from the crackdown.  I've not seen it, but it sounds pretty unsettling.  

Bahrain:  It sounds as though things have quieted down for the time being, but Bahrain is still dealing with the fallout from the previous protests and crackdowns.  Quiet doesn't necessarily mean good, however, as the BBC is reporting that hundreds of people are still in jail and there are reports of widespread torture.  Not terribly surprising, but it's important to keep in mind the fact that the violence carries on even once the streets have cleared.    

The Future of Political Science (summary, short discussion)

I have mentioned, in a previous post, all of the books that fill up my summer reading list. As of now, I have at least one book completed and several more have been added to my list.  I have recently finished The Future of Political Science: 100 Perspectives, a collection of 100 short articles aimed at discussing what has not been properly analyzed or should be analyzed in political science.  The book ended up being more oriented towards the fields of American and Comparative than I had originally anticipated (mostly by the title); however, this is more my own fault than anything else. Quickly browsing the titles of the 100 articles and the authors or knowing that the book is a festshcrift for Sidney Verba easily conveys that information.

The book is not homogeneous.  For example, the two initial sections take opposing views with Arend Lijphart arguing that the United States is more unique than comparative scholars give it credit for and Russell Dalton taking the opposed position that US institutions have far more in common with other states than what has been examined previously. There are clusters of articles that deal with similar topics (e.g. elite behavior, institutions, voting, parties), but not all topics have a set of opposing viewpoints (nor should they necessarily). The introductory chapter offers a few rubrics for organization of the book that were ultimately rejected and provides some glimpse of the diversity of the subjects that are covered.

Beyond several substantive propositions, the book also has some focus on methodology. None of the articles that discuss political methodology were overly technical or beyond an average political scientist's comprehension of what is being discussed. The range of approaches vary form those who question the utility of quantitative political science in research to those who articulate more inclusion of qualitative methods or theoretical understandings of applying econometric techniques to political science.  For example, David Butler has a very short piece that argues "Everything happens in a historical context. It is wise to be sceptical about articles on politics that never mention individual politicians. Specific leaders do make a difference. What if Gore not Bush had been adjudged the winner in 2000? What if Blair had yielded precedence to Brown in 1994? No numerical approach will explain the impact of Churchill in 1940 or of Kennedy in the early 1960s The run of history is not inevitable."

The collection is diverse.  For Comparative and American scholars looking for potential dissertation topics or a new topic to work on, this might be an ideal book to thumb through and read. I will have to recommend some of the short pieces on elite behavior and third party representation to two different friends.

Good for the Money: International Finance, State Capacity, and Internal Armed Conflict

Things are pretty crazy around here with the impending school year and upcoming conference season.  However, since the country is currently swept up in credit rating mania, I figured I would take the time to pass along some new research that is immediately relevant and serves as a nice complement to the Pontichelli and Voth paper being discussed over at the Monkey Cage.  From my fellow Binghamton graduate students Matthew Digiuseppe and Colin Barry, as well as former Binghamton graduate student and current UNO faculty member Richard Frank:

Previous research indicates that a lack of state capacity is a key determinant of internal armed conflict.  Scholars identify several internal dimensions of state capacity, but have yet to explore how international finance influences state resources.  This is surprising because sovereign lending has increased dramatically in recent decades and plays an increasing role in the functioning of developed and developing governments. In this article, we explore this relationship between a state’s integration into global credit markets and its subsequent capacity to promote domestic stability.  We argue that international capital increases a state’s ability to respond to internal opposition because states with favorable credit terms can expand their resource base beyond domestic constraints to deter, accommodate, or repress opposition while maintaining a level provision of resources to their political base.  We examine the influence that both capital access and credit terms have on the risk of civil conflict in 141 countries from 1981-2007. Our empirical results indicate that states with affordable credit access are indeed less likely to experience civil conflict.

The paper can be found here.  It is forthcoming at the Journal of Peace Research.

Pushback

Just a quick post on some interesting articles coming from Defense News recently...

Debt Ceiling

This information comes from the Office of Management and Budget's Historical Tables of the US Government's budget.  Just some basic information on the debt ceiling that might put the current political wrangling into greater context.  I will add the usual disclaimer that this is not my usual playground, so if anyone catches any mistakes please let me know.

Below is a quick graphic illustrating the points at which the debt ceiling has been raised since 1940.  These figures have not been adjusted for inflation.  The dots show the point at which the debt ceiling was raised, or a point at which a previous raise in the debt ceiling was reaffirmed/extended, while the line is intended to give the viewer a better ability to connect the dots (so to speak).  

This second graph adjusted the previous figures for inflation (billions of 2009 dollars).

Of note---If my count is right, President Reagan increased the debt ceiling 18 times during his administration, from a starting point of $985 billion to $2.8 trillion.  The Clinton administration increased the debt limit 6 times from $4.3 trillion to $5.95 trillion.  The second Bush administration 7 times from $6.4 trillion to $11.3 trillion.  Of the data available (it only runs through 2009 here) the Obama administration increased the debt limit from $11.3 trillion to $12.1 trillion.  

The real point at which the debt ceiling seems to take off is during the Reagan administration.  Prior to this point government seemed to keep closer tabs on the debt limit---although there are several dots on the graphics above prior to the Reagan administration, many of these cases are simply reaffirming or briefly extending previous raises to the debt limit.  Others can probably speak to this in greater detail, but this seems to make sense given that the Reagan administration was characterized by unusually high peacetime military spending.  The second point at which the debt ceiling rises seems to be during the second Bush presidency.  This also seems to make sense given the tremendous levels of spending for the war on terror.  

Republicans have been campaigning on the fiscal irresponsibility of Democrats, but a cursory inspection of these charts suggest that recent Republican presidencies don't have a great track record of keeping the debt ceiling down.  Earlier Republican presidencies (Eisenhower, Nixon, and Ford) seem to have been better at this.  That said, this does not take into account a host of other factors (international crises, which party controls Congress, divided government, etc.) so this is far from conclusive.  Still, if the argument is that the president is accountable for what happens on their watch then the fact remains that Republican presidents have presided over the greatest increases in the debt ceiling.