The Quantitative Peace

Chuck Hagel and Bipartisanship in Foreign Policy

The news surrounding Obama's nomination of Chuck Hagel and John Brennan as Secretary of Defense and Director of the CIA (respectively) has primarily been focused on the "controversial" Hagel's previous statements and positions. Republican commentators have been complaining about Hagel's nomination, claiming that his nomination sends a powerful signal that the Obama administration is putting more "daylight" between the US and Israel, among other things. Steve Clemmons at The Atlantic has also reviewed several arguments for and against Hagel's nomination. The turf on that subject has already been covered pretty thoroughly, so I'll leave the issue be for now. What has received less attention, however, is that Hagel's nomination represents a continuation of a fairly long history of Democrats appointing Republicans to positions within the foreign policy bureaucracy. 

In 1940 FDR appointed Henry Stimson and Frank Knox—both Republicans—to be his Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy (again, respectively). Stimson's appointment in particular is generally regarded as marking the onset of the bipartisan consensus that characterized the early Cold War period. Having previously served as Secretary of State under President Hoover and Secretary of War under Taft, Stimson was already a widely recognized figure in the foreign policymaking community (such as it was back then). Along with Stimson came John McCloy and Robert Lovett, both of whom were also Republicans and both of whom served as Stimson's assistants in the War Department.

By bringing these Republicans into his administration, Roosevelt was attempting to build support among opposition Republicans for increasing US activism in World War II. Primarily this encompassed moderate internationalist Republicans from the Northeast. Even prior to his nomination, Stimson and his mentor, Elihu Root, himself previously a Secretary of War and Secretary of State, had petitioned Congressional leadership to introduce some form of draft bill to prepare the US for involvement in the growing conflicts in Europe and East Asia. Stimson and Root had both been devout internationalists in the years leading up to the Second World War, and their appointment marked what many historians have labeled as the beginning of the "Eastern Establishment" in foreign policymaking. The Establishment narrative, broadly speaking, tends to emphasize bipartisanship in the foreign policy bureaucracy specifically, but it also encompasses themes of elite influence, economic interests, and political polarization in foreign policymaking.

This general narrative has been present for several decades in the US foreign policy literature, but it's largely been isolated to the qualitative political science and historical literatures. Quantitative political science research has delved into the more narrow issue of bipartisanship, but these studies have tended to focus on Congress. Accordingly, the central focus of this large body of work has gone unexamined in a systematic sense, and part of my dissertation research has attempted to address this gap. This is really all a long-winded way of saying that the Hagel nomination provides me with a timely opportunity to briefly share some of my work on the subject. Though I don't want to give away the farm here, this seems like a fine time to chime in. 

Despite the recognition that the foreign policy bureaucracy—indeed, the bureaucracy more broadly—plays a fairly prominent role in the policymaking process, we don't really have much in the way of systematic quantitative research on the subject. I've tried to get at some of these issues in my dissertation by collecting some new data on appointees to foreign policymaking positions within the foreign policy bureaucracy. I primarily focus on the State Department and the Defense Department, but I also focus on some other agencies like the CIA. In total, I've collected data on some 1,000+ individuals serving in these posts from 1948 through the present. One of the primary characteristics that I coded for each individual was what, if any, party affiliation that individual had. As a way to get at trends in bipartisanship within the foreign policy bureaucracy, the graph below shows the percentage of appointments included in the data set that are bipartisan in nature.* 

Some interesting points: Perhaps not surprisingly, the Truman administration represents an all-time high in the data. This is partially a function of the fact that Truman inherited many of FDR's appointments, but it's also partially due to the fact that the foreign policy bureaucracy was undergoing some pretty radical changes during this time period. In particular, the size of these agencies grew dramatically during the World War II period. Coding rules are also partially responsible, as I focused on individuals occupying positions at the assistant secretary level and up (where appropriate). By the early to mid-1950s, however, the rate of growth slows a bit and, while still increasing in size, it does so more slowly than in the first few years of the Cold War. The crash at the beginning of the Eisenhower administration might reflect some of the antics of Joseph McCarthy and Secretary Dulles, both of whom were more than a little keen to go after anyone remotely suspected of being communists. It could also be a function of the Republicans having been out of power for about two decades. Also of note, the late 1970s do see a slight slump in the level of bipartisanship, which is potentially in line with arguments concerning the impact of Vietnam on bipartisanship more generally. The Clinton administration sees a fairly sharp spike near the end, and the Bush administration also sees a dip in its later years, while the incoming Obama administration sees a slight increase.

More broadly, the work that I've done so far suggests a few general trends. First, I find some evidence that, all else equal, Democrats tend to be more likely than Republicans to make bipartisan appointments to the foreign policy bureaucracy—Even controlling for the Truman administration. Other models suggest this difference is more acute in the early Cold War period (again, also while controlling for Truman). Additionally, I also find some evidence to support the conventional wisdom concerning the use of bipartisan appointments as a means of building moderate coalitions and as a response to domestic political conditions. In particular Congressional support matters, but is perhaps a little more nuanced than the historical accounts often suggest, as the availability of moderates in Congress also seems to condition this relationship. It also appears as though Presidents make these appointments with an eye towards governing more broadly, as the composition of the Senate alone appears to have little impact.

So what? Well, with respect to current news my work would suggest that Obama's retention of Bob Gates and his appointment of Chuck Hagel are actually very much in line with broader trends in Democratic foreign policy appointments since World War II. Robert Lovett—formerly Stimson's assistant at the War Department—went on to serve as Truman's Secretary of Defense. Kennedy subsequently offered Lovett his choice of State, Defense, and Treasury. Though Lovett turned him down, Kennedy did end up appointing Robert McNamara and McGeorge Bundy—both Republicans—to important posts. While there are certainly other lesser-known bipartisan appointees, these folks are some of the more prominent. Furthermore, these trends emerged well before the Republicans had fully taken on the identity of the party of national security. Still, even in the early Cold War period the Republicans did attack Democrats for being soft on Communism, so this vulnerability was present in some incarnation. Accordingly, Democratic administrations perhaps had more to gain from trying to draw in Republicans than vice versa, as such appointments could confer some measure of credibility. 

Moving forward it will be interesting to see how these trends continue to develop. Despite the much publicized opposition to Hagel's appointment it is entirely possible that this is just media hype and Republican chest-thumping. David Karol at the Monkey Cage recently wrote about the House Republicans' position-taking when voting on the recent Fiscal Cliff deal. So it's easy to imagine that the Republican outcry over Hagel's nomination is really going to wither when it comes time for the Senate to vote. Though these situations are not completely comparable, giving Obama a hard time seems to be a means of gaining currency in the Republican Party these days. Beyond the current confirmation battle, much of this will depend on how the current debate over the GOP's foreign policy positions pans out (see Drezner's latest Foreign Affairs piece, for example). If the Democrats manage to become the party of national security moving forward, perhaps we might see a reversal of these trends. Given the current Republican field, however, I wouldn't hold my breath.**

 * Given that none of this work/data is published (yet?) please don't cite this post or data. I'm still very much hoping to update and improve this material as I go. I guess this is kind of the norm, right?

** In the off chance that anyone comments, please be aware that I have had trouble leaving comments in the recent past. On the rare occasion that we do get feedback, I feel rude not replying, so apologies in advance if this should happen.

Bureaucratic Politics, Interservice Rivalries, and The Galactic Empire

The fact that this post follows so closely on the heels of my recent post regarding the sparseness of posts over the next couple of months should in no way be taken as negating my previous point. That said, Steve Saideman at the Duck has linked to this fairly lengthy piece on the role of inter-service rivalries in bringing about the downfall of the Galactic Empire. I will say that I have not had a chance to read the whole thing yet, but given that I 1) am a Star Wars enthusiast, and 2) have done work on inter-service rivalries, I find this to be potentially interesting. 

That is all.

Human Rights and NGOs

I've been working recently on quite a few projects that deal with human rights and NGOs, and today's BBC podcast has quite a bit of material that is relevant to these topics. 

First, there's a story regarding a new law that is being debated in Russia that would require NGOs receiving funding from external sources to label themselves as "foreign agents" in all of their state documentation and internet materials. The law would also increase the amount of bookkeeping required by the Russian government to allow NGOs to operate within Russia. Failure to abide by the new law's requirements would result in fines and a possible two-year jail sentence. This measure comes on the heals of more of Putin's shenanigans (see here and here). The BBC segment has some interesting interviews with Russian MPs, who justify the legislation on the grounds that NGOs are acting at the behest of Western and US interests in an effort to undermine Russian democracy. 

The second segment of interest concerns the disappearance and execution of people during the 1970s by the military government in Argentina. I've just spent a bit of time reading Keck and Sikkink's 1998 book, Activists Beyond Borders. It just so happens that the authors have a nice and concise account of the role played by NGOs in exposing the activities of the military government during this time period—one that I found myself drawing upon only yesterday. The BBC segment expands a bit upon the details concerning disappearances involving young pregnant women, and the details are both interesting and appalling. Essentially, women were kidnapped, but the authorities often waiting until the women gave birth before executing them. The babies were subsequently handled in a variety of ways, but apparently many children were dropped off at hospitals, while many others were adopted by military families. 

Military Capabilities

Phil Arena has a very cool post up wherein he explores a potential alternative to the ubiquitous CINC score for measuring military capabilities. This strikes me as something that is long overdue.  And there are a couple of things that I like about the measure just from taking a quick glance at it. First, given that China just launched its first aircraft carrier, which is actually a refurbished Soviet carrier if I recall correctly, I think the notion that China has already surpassed the US in terms of military capabilities is a big pill to swallow. Second, just glancing at his figures for European powers during the late 19th century, Phil's measure looks more noisy, which in truth is kind of what I'd actually expect to see. The CINC measure makes there appear to be a lot more stability than I would expect to come along with a period where many of these European powers are vying for access to colonial possessions, foreign markets, etc. Furthermore, there were definite differences in terms of how each of these countries allocated their military resources. England certainly had the dominant navy during the late 1800s, but countries like France, Germany, and Russia had advantages in terms of their ability to field ground forces that the British just didn't possess.  

As Phil mentions, the measure may need some further development, but I still think this is really neat. 

On the Utility of IR Research

At the Duck of Minerva, Josh Busby has a post on the gap between political science research/IR and the policymaking community. I don't have a whole lot to say about the specific content of Busby's post, aside from the fact that I think this is an interesting an important debate to have. (Also, please note that the links in the quotations were provided in Busby's original post).

Using private information to beat Death

 

 

In Bill and Ted's Bogus Journey (not to be confused with their most Excellent Adventure), the duo are killed and sent to Hell.  On their way to an eternity of punishment, Death gives them the ability to escape their fate if they can best him in a game of their choosing.  The wager seems to be an obvious one to take: If you lose, you are stuck in hell for eternity; if you win, you can leave.  However, if you do not play the game, then you are still stuck in Hell without the ability to leave. In a previous dialogue (not shown in the above clip), Death boasts that he has never lost a game. 

If Death really never lost a game, it is reasonable to assume he has played billions of such games (assuming billions have encountered him and wanted to leave).  A variety of games are likely to have been proposed including athletic competitions (perhaps the most common up until this point in history), strategic games with full information, and even gambles.  Given this, Death would have to be some sort of super athlete that makes the right move every time (perfectly rational), and wins all lotteries. Even in fair lotteries, Death could only win so many coin tosses in a row before it appears the game is rigged in his favor.  As an aside, it is likely that no single player would know that he has played coin tosses before and won so many in the past, but his boast out to tip players off.  Thus, unfair lotteries biased in favor of the condemned are likely to still be skewed in their actual results for Death.

Given these constraints established by the movie, the question for the viewer becomes obvious: What game would you choose to play against Death?

 

After some pondering, the optimal game would be one of private information--where the player can control elements outside of Death's control.  As such, Death's ability to win depends on his ability to guess what the player has chosen. Given this proposition, then it appears that Bill and Ted stumbled upon the right course of action in their initial choice: Battleship.  In a world where you are playing the best strategy possible without cheating, the average win using a decent algorithm averages 40 moves. If we posit that Death plays perfectly strategically without knowing what the players know, then there is room for the other player to do better than Death.  So, Bill and Ted knowing he would put his ship in the J row may work out as a better strategy given their glimpse into Death's psychology. Clue, again, affords them room for private information in guessing which character committed the murder of Mr. Body.  Twister, on the other hand, I lack a convincing interpretation as it is clearly a game of athletics.  Perhaps Gymnasts have not challenged Death before.  Though, of course, I am sure the script was written with the idea of seeing an ancient mythological being playing modern games against two relatively airheaded dudes and not with a mind towards game theory.

Given this understanding of how to beat death, and while Bill and Ted succeed in finding the right path to victory, they allow too much for error.  If Death can lose at games of private information, then the best strategy is to make it a game of asymmetric private information instead of a symmetric one (technically, a symmetric, asymmetric information game) like Battleship.  Simply, offering Death a game of "Guess What Number I Am Thinking Of" and making the possible set of numbers contain all numbers would make Death's ability to guess the number indistinguishable from zero.  The game is much less fun, but the certainty it provides makes it an optimal choice given the symmetric alternative.  For this solution to be accurate, then it means that either people have never played an asymmetric information game against Death, that his strategy was superior to his opponent's in stategy previous games and could overcome the information asymmetry, or, perhaps, he was simply boasting to dissuade would-be challengers.  Also, this is what happens when you leave Comedy Central on during the day while doing house chores. 

The Syrian Civil War II

So it's official...ish. It's official-ish.  Or maybe not. The BBC reports that the UN Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, Herve Ladsous, seems to be the first official to publicly describe the Syrian civil war as a civil war, as opposed to something moving ever closer to that oh so elusive place. However, the article also notes that others have pushed back against this description (big surprise). Officials from the Syrian Foreign Ministry are opting to describe the conflict as follows:  

Talk of civil war in Syria is not consistent with reality... What is happening in Syria is a war against armed groups that choose terrorism.

So they don't quibble with the use of the word "war," but simply the notion that what Syria is experiencing is of the civil variety. Coming from Syrian officials, however, I get it, and I don't really find this to be terribly surprising.

What I'm curious about is how this comment by a UN official will impact the way other public officials talk about the Syrian civil war, henceforth. Last week I wrote about how there has been a widespread reluctance among US, UN, and other policymakers to refer to the Syrian conflict as a civil war. Here's a piece at the NY Times from yesterday addressing the same issue. Barbara Walter and Elizabeth Martin offer some suggestions as to why that might be, and I've offered a few of my own followup thoughts here.

Will more senior officials publicly rebuke Ladsous for comments? Label them "premature"? "Hasty"? Will there be some sort of domino effect, whereby Ladsous' comments make open the door for other policymakers to start using the label? Perhaps there is something to be said for the label arising from the "bottom up" so to speak. Though, I'm not entirely sure that Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations constitutes coming from the bottom. Still, perhaps now that someone with "expertise" in this area (almost like a scientist or something) has used the label, higher level officials will feel that they have cover to use the term. Whereas if Barack Obama or Hillary Clinton were to trot out the term first, it could seem more "political" in its derivations? 

Of course, this is all an exercise in aimless musing. Thoughts? 

The Syrian Civil War

Over at the new Political Violence at a Glance blog, Barbara Walter and Elizabeth Martin address a question that I raised last week regarding the reluctance of policymakers to label the Syrian conflict a civil war. Walter and Martin raise three/four points in particular (I may be lumping something together here) to help explain this behavior, but I have a couple of further questions/comments. 

Don't Call It A Comeback (This Civil War Has Been Here For Years)

Well, maybe not years. And LL Cool J references aside, while perusing my usual news outlets this morning I've found that in the wake of what is reported to be a fresh massacre, Syria is again a common theme in the headlines (see CNN, BBC, FP). More after the jump.

NSF Funding Amendment, Part II

Erik Voeten at the Monkey Cage with an update on the amendment that cuts NSF funding for political science programs. A version of the amendment passed the House with a vote of 218-208. You can see the breakdown of the votes here (thanks for Erik for so conveniently providing the link to the votes). Erik also notes a couple of important points: 1) This is not the end of the issue, and 2) No other discipline was singled out in the same way as political science. 

Other interesting facts:

1. Jeff Flake has a BA in International Relations (see his official House bio page).
2. Jeff Flake has an MA in Political Science (see his official House bio page).
3. As described above, political science appears to have been singled out. In 2011 political science programs were awarded approximately $21 million dollars. Keep in mind these are awarded amounts, and do not reflect the actual amount spent in a given year. The Duck of Minerva makes reference to actual annual expenditures being something closer to $9 million. 
4. Economics programs were awarded $55 million in 2011. If we assume a similar pattern applies, that means econ programs are getting somewhere around $23 million per year in actual appropriations.
5. Sociology programs were awarded approximately $15.5 million, working out to be about $6.7million per year.

Political science awards do not even come close to what economics programs are awarded each year. Consequently, I'm not entirely sure what the fiscal justification for this cut can be. To single out only political science in this way would seem to indicate the gripe is more substantive than fiscal. If not, then why not make a flat cut of 10%-20% across all BSES programs? Spread the cuts evenly? You could cut the annual econ awards by half and that would be the equivalent of cutting all of the annual political science awards AND some of the sociology program. So, what gives?

There is probably a better/more efficient source for summary information than what I used, but you can search NSF records of programs and awards here. My estimates of yearly expenditures are extremely rough. Again, it's important to note that these are awarded amounts, not what is actually spent each year. There is going to be overlap from one year to the next as programs are often funded over the course of a couple of years. There is also some degree of overlap between programs as well. Accordingly, the figures provided should be taken as rough guidelines/comparisons, as well as with a healthy grain of salt. If anyone has a link to actual annual expenditure statistics by program, as opposed to awards, please share. I did a quick search this morning but didn't find anything more helpful than this particular source.